By Sheikh Omar
On October 21, Russian President Vladimir Putin welcomed US special envoy Steve Witkoff to St Petersburg and suggested that he could meet President Donald Trump in China. Putin also raised the possibility of restoring economic relations with the United States. Later that day, he met Chinese Premier Li Qiang and reaffirmed Moscow’s close partnership with Beijing.
The timing was revealing. Russia appears to want better relations with Washington without giving up its relationship with China.
A meeting between Trump and Putin, or even a three-way summit with Chinese President Xi Jinping, has been discussed around the November 18–19 APEC gathering in Shenzhen. Nothing has been agreed. Yet the proposal raises a question beyond the war in Ukraine: is a new strategic triangle taking shape among the United States, Russia and China?
A Familiar Triangle, Different Conditions
The idea has a famous precedent. In 1972, President Richard Nixon visited Beijing after years of hostility between the United States and communist China. Nixon and his adviser Henry Kissinger saw an opportunity in the deep split between China and the Soviet Union. Better relations with Beijing gave Washington more room to negotiate with Moscow.
The lesson is sometimes simplified: win over one rival to weaken another. But the Sino-Soviet split existed before Nixon’s opening. Washington took advantage of a division it had not created.
Today, there is no comparable break between Moscow and Beijing. Both oppose important aspects of American global influence, cooperate diplomatically, and benefit from economic ties. Trump cannot simply repeat Nixon’s approach in reverse. The more realistic question is whether limited cooperation with Russia could change the balance within a partnership that remains important to both countries.
Russia and China share concerns about American power and have invested years in strategic cooperation. Their partnership is not merely a temporary response to sanctions
Washington’s Two Agendas
The immediate American goal is to end the Ukraine war. Before going to Russia, Witkoff met Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and European representatives in Oslo. Putin subsequently agreed in principle to resume US-mediated talks involving Russia and Ukraine. Agreement to negotiate, however, is not agreement on peace terms.
Washington may also see an opportunity to reduce Russia’s dependence on China. A Russia with more economic options might feel less pressure to support Beijing in every disagreement with the United States. Yet there is no clear evidence that Trump has adopted a strategy to separate Russia from China. It remains a possibility to examine, not a policy to assume.
Trump has identified another purpose for a possible three-leader meeting. On October 19, he said such talks could focus on nuclear weapons and denuclearization rather than mainly on Ukraine.
That matters because New START, the last treaty limiting deployed American and Russian strategic nuclear weapons, expired in February 2026. China’s arsenal is growing but remains much smaller than those of the United States and Russia. A three-way arms-control process would face a difficult problem: how can powers with such unequal forces accept obligations that all regard as fair? Even an agreement on transparency or risk reduction would require careful negotiation.
Putin’s Search for More Options
Putin has reasons to welcome talks even without making major concessions in Ukraine. A meeting with an American president supports Moscow’s claim to be a power that cannot be ignored. The prospect of sanctions relief and renewed trade offers economic incentives. By offering to discuss other problems, including Iran, Russia can also show that its usefulness to Washington extends beyond Ukraine.
Western sanctions have pushed Russian trade toward Asia. China buys Russian energy and supplies manufactured goods, from vehicles to electronics. Despite a fall from 2024, bilateral trade still exceeded $200 billion in 2025.
The relationship helps Russia withstand Western pressure, but it also creates an imbalance. China trades widely; Russia has fewer alternatives. Reopening some economic links with the West could give Moscow greater freedom to negotiate, including with Beijing.
But economic flexibility is not the same as changing sides. Russia and China share concerns about American power and have invested years in strategic cooperation. Their partnership is not merely a temporary response to sanctions. Moscow may want more choices without sacrificing the benefits of its closest major-power relationship.
Why Beijing Matters
For China, hosting such a meeting could bring prestige. A summit of three major powers on Chinese soil would show Xi as a leader who can bring rivals together. It could also give Beijing a stronger voice on European security and nuclear issues.
Yet the choice of venue has risks. APEC is mainly an economic forum. A high-profile geopolitical meeting might overshadow its trade focus. Beijing would also watch closely for any U.S. effort to use better ties with Moscow against China.
Nuclear arms control is another sensitive point. China has rejected limits that would treat its smaller arsenal the same as the much larger American and Russian ones. It may support talks on strategic stability but refuse equal numerical caps.
Putin’s meeting with Li Qiang on the same day as his talks with Witkoff makes the point clear. Moscow wants to negotiate with Washington while keeping Beijing reassured. For Putin, China is more than a convenient location. It is a way to show that talking to the United States does not mean turning against China.
Ukraine and Europe Cannot Be Spectators
Those most affected by the war cannot be left out. Ukraine is not just a problem for Washington and Moscow to solve. Its sovereignty, territory and future security guarantees must be central to any lasting deal.
European governments also have strong interests. They would pay a high price if a settlement failed, through renewed fighting or long-term defense costs. Talks that ignore Kyiv or Europe might create headlines but not real stability.
Two kinds of diplomacy should stay separate. Talks among Ukraine, Russia and the United States are about ending the war. A possible Trump-Putin-Xi meeting is about wider relations among major powers. The second cannot replace the first.
A Triangle Without a Fixed Shape
Each side has different hopes. Washington may want progress on Ukraine, lower nuclear risks and a Russia less dependent on China. Putin wants sanctions relief and more freedom to act without losing Beijing. Xi could gain international status while protecting China’s strategic position.
None of this means a summit is certain, still less a new alliance. The world is not simply returning to the triangular diplomacy of the 1970s. It may be moving toward a more complex pattern in which countries work together on some issues and compete hard on others.
The real question is not whether Trump and Putin meet in China. It is whether these three powers can negotiate limited agreements without treating Ukraine, Europe and smaller countries as bargaining chips.
