Turkish military capabilities came into sharp focus in March 2020. In retaliation for the killing of 34 Turkish soldiers, Turkey launched punitive strikes against the Assad regime’s forces threatening Idlib Province. Relying heavily on unmanned aircraft, Turkish forces inflicted substantial losses on Assad’s army, destroying tanks, armoured personnel carriers and Russian-supplied air-defence systems.
What made the feat particularly noteworthy was the use of an indigenous airframe, flight-control software, electro-optical sensors, communications, datalinks and precision-guided munitions, all integrated into a single system. From platform to sensor to munition, Turkey had integrated a largely domestically developed kill chain.
The reputation of Turkish drones was further enhanced by their performance in Azerbaijan and Ukraine, where they were used to degrade Russian-supplied mobile air-defence systems. Although Turkish drones stole the limelight, they are only a small part of a much larger and deeper change in Turkey’s armaments industry.
Hard lessons
Turkey learned hard lessons during its 1974 intervention in Cyprus. Although Turkey possessed a large and capable force, it relied primarily on Western weapon systems, and the subsequent embargo laid bare Turkey’s vulnerability. Turkey’s staunchly secular military elite assumed that they had been welcomed into the fold of the West as equals, but soon realised that in Europe some are more equal than others. The response of Europe and the US was eye-opening and reinforced Ankara’s perception that its Western allies did not always share its security priorities.
Further incentives to complete indigenisation efforts came in 2016. The Austrian Parliament unanimously voted in November 2016 to impose an arms export embargo and restrictions on Turkey targeting military and dual-use goods, which significantly delayed Turkey’s Altay Tank programme. In 2015, Turkish engine maker Tümosan signed a €190 million contract with the Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB) to develop an indigenous power pack for the Altay main battle tank. Tümosan had partnered with Austrian powertrain specialist AVL List GmbH for technical support and integration know-how. But the arms embargo led to the cancellation of the contract and forced Turkey to contract BMC to develop an indigenous power pack and transmission for the tank.
Turkey has moved from an industry centred on foreign procurement and licensed production to one capable of designing, manufacturing, integrating and exporting complete weapons systems with minimal foreign subsystems
Austria later pushed for a broader EU-wide arms embargo during Turkey’s military offensive in northern Syria in 2019, though a complete bloc-wide consensus faced divisions among member states.
Turkey at that time did not have the industrial base to support a significant defence industry and would need to develop the industrial capacity from scratch. The most significant institutional step came in 1985 with the establishment of SAGEB, the organisation that subsequently became the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries and, in 2018, the Presidency of Defence Industries, or SSB. Its purpose was not simply to buy weapons more efficiently. It was to use procurement to build domestic industrial capability.
Lacking a significant industrial base and technical know-how to design systems independently, Turkey initially sought partnerships to produce existing systems or components of them. The most prestigious of these was the F-16 programme.
Turkey signed an agreement with the US for licensed production of F-16s in 1983. Turkish Aerospace Industries subsequently manufactured 152 aircraft in the first production programme, with the Turkish industrial contribution expanding substantially as experience accumulated. Turkish Aerospace ultimately manufactured around 70% of the F-16 airframe in the first production phase and approximately 80% in the subsequent programme. As well as the airframe, TEI also acquired experience through licensed production and assembly of F110 engines.
The significance of the F-16 programme extended well beyond the aircraft and even the aerospace industry. The programme created engineers, technicians, production managers, quality-control specialists and tooling expertise, but also created the industrial culture that is required to produce a modern military-industrial complex. It taught Turkish industry how modern weapons systems are actually developed and manufactured.
The real acceleration came after 2002 under the tenure of President Erdoğan. Turkey benefited from geography: Western companies looking to preserve margins in the face of wage inflation across Europe outsourced production. Turkey was an ideal destination, close to European infrastructure and markets, with a skilled but comparatively lower-cost workforce, situated right on the edge of Europe, where transport overland made just-in-time production feasible. During the era of globalisation, Turkey’s manufacturing economy expanded significantly.
With a naturally expanding industrial base, Ankara increasingly concluded that it no longer needed to purchase increasingly sophisticated and expensive foreign weapons, leaving it strategically vulnerable and draining its foreign currency reserves. The new procurement philosophy placed greater emphasis on indigenous development, local subcontracting, domestic intellectual property and exportability.
Unlike the more state-dominated defence industries of Egypt and Pakistan, Turkey’s sector relies heavily on private companies, alongside important state-owned enterprises. The state creates guaranteed demand through long-term procurement programmes, while companies are encouraged to develop products that meet this demand and could subsequently be sold abroad to offset development and production costs.
The Turkish armed forces provide a large, reliable initial customer, which allows the mostly private defence companies to obtain loans from private financial institutions to finance the development costs of a multitude of weapon systems, which are then offered for export.
Politics have aided Turkey in this endeavour. With Western governments reluctant to sell to some developing-country customers due to proliferation, human rights and other political concerns, Turkey has constituted a middle ground. Nations unwilling to attract the ire of the US by buying Russian or Chinese, or those whose security is threatened by China and Russia, see Turkey as a reliable source for defence-related products, because Turkish products can offer competitive capabilities at lower prices than many Western alternatives.
Even Western nations wary of a reliance on the US, but conscious of the cost associated with Western systems, have opted for Turkish weapon systems. Spain signed a €2.6 billion contract with Turkey for 30 Hürjet trainer/light attack aircraft; Romania has also pursued Turkish defence procurement, including a deal involving Otokar’s Cobra II armoured vehicles. But most importantly of all, Poland signed a major $410 million contract with Turkish defence giant Aselsan to supply state-of-the-art electronic warfare systems. This builds on Poland’s previous direct purchase of 24 Bayraktar TB2 armed combat drones, making them the first EU/NATO nation to operate Turkish unmanned aerial vehicles.
The programme created engineers, technicians, production managers, quality-control specialists and tooling expertise, but also created the industrial culture that is required to produce a modern military-industrial complex
As stated, Turkey’s defence sector comprises a multitude of private companies. According to government investment data, there is a network of around 4,500 companies engaged in the defence and aerospace sector. This provides Turkey with a deep industrial base on which to draw for future projects.
The most important of these companies are:
TUSAŞ — Turkish Aerospace (TUSAŞ) is the country’s principal military aerospace integrator. Its portfolio now includes the Hürkuş trainer, T129 ATAK attack helicopter, T625 Gökbey utility helicopter, ANKA family of UAVs, ANKA-3 unmanned combat aircraft, Hürjet advanced jet trainer and the KAAN fighter programme.
TUSAŞ also remains deeply connected to Turkey’s earlier F-16 experience.
The Gökbey is particularly significant because it demonstrates the transition from licensed production towards an indigenous helicopter. The programme is increasingly paired with the domestically developed TEI TS1400 turboshaft engine.
By 2025, the Gökbey programme had moved into serial production, with a contract for another 57 helicopters taking total orders to 83.
ASELSAN — If TUSAŞ is Turkey’s principal aerospace integrator, ASELSAN is arguably the technological nervous system of the defence industry. It produces an enormous range of electronic components and subsystems that are used by other companies to produce whole systems. Its role spans radar, communications, electro-optics, electronic warfare, navigation, fire control and command-and-control.
Its products include:
- AESA and other radar systems;
- electro-optical sensors;
- electronic warfare systems;
- military communications;
- tactical radios;
- command-and-control systems;
- fire-control systems;
- remote weapon stations;
- missile seekers and guidance electronics;
- naval combat systems;
- air-defence components;
- active protection systems.
ASELSAN’s importance is difficult to overstate because many apparently different Turkish weapons systems share its underlying electronics.
Its 2025 revenue was approximately TL180.4 billion, and average employment exceeded 17,000 in the first half of 2026.
The company is now expanding production capacity on a scale commensurate with mass production rather than prototype manufacture. Its $1.5 billion Oğulbey Technology Base is intended to expand production substantially and is particularly important for the Steel Dome integrated air-defence programme.
ROKETSAN — Turkey’s principal missile and rocket specialist.
Its portfolio covers anti-tank missiles, anti-ship missiles, air-defence missiles, cruise missiles, guided bombs and rocket systems.
Major programmes include ATMACA, SOM, UMTAS, L-UMTAS, MAM, TRG/TRLG, Tayfun, SİPER, HİSAR and a growing family of precision-guided weapons.
ROKETSAN’s importance lies in the breadth of its portfolio. Turkey is no longer dependent on one foreign missile supplier for every category of weapon.
The company reported turnover exceeding $2 billion in 2025 and expected a substantial production increase in 2026 as new investments entered service.
MKE — An important exception to the private-sector emphasis, MKE is a state-owned enterprise. It provides the industrial foundation for ammunition and artillery.
Its portfolio extends from small-arms ammunition to artillery ammunition, aircraft bombs, rockets, explosives, guns and larger weapon systems.
The scale is substantial. In 2025, MKE reported deliveries of more than 95 million rounds of small-arms ammunition, more than 990,000 rocket, explosive and heavy-weapons munitions, more than 2,950 aircraft bombs, approximately 17,000 small arms and more than 450 heavy weapons and weapon systems.
These figures illustrate an often-overlooked point: defence independence depends as much on ammunition production as on sophisticated platforms.
BMC — is becoming particularly important in land systems.
Although BMC Power also produces a broad range of indigenous military engines ranging from the TUNA (400 hp), LEVEND/AZRA (600 hp) and UTKU (1,000 hp), its principal programme is the Altay main battle tank, tactical vehicles and military power systems.
Altay represents an important stage in Turkey’s attempt to move beyond producing armoured vehicles towards producing a complete modern tank ecosystem, including its own engine and transmission.
The first production Altays initially use South Korean power-pack components, but BMC Power has developed the indigenous BATU 1,500-horsepower power group, which passed factory acceptance testing in 2025 and is in the process of being mated with an indigenous automatic transmission.
FNSS and Otokar — These companies have created one of the world’s more substantial medium-sized armoured-vehicle industries.
Their products include tracked infantry fighting vehicles, wheeled armoured vehicles, amphibious vehicles, reconnaissance vehicles and tactical platforms.
Turkey’s industry has delivered thousands of armoured vehicles, with Turkish officials stating that more than 4,500 armoured vehicles have been delivered to approximately 50 countries.
This is an area where Turkey has achieved both technological depth and significant export scale.
STM and the naval industry — Turkey’s naval industry has also undergone a remarkable transformation.
The MILGEM programme began with corvettes and has expanded into the larger İstif-class frigates. Turkish shipyards now construct major warships incorporating increasingly large numbers of Turkish-designed sensors, combat-management systems, weapons and electronic systems.
The İstif-class frigates incorporate systems including ASELSAN’s Gökdeniz close-in weapon system, Cenk-S radar, Akrep fire-control radar, MİDLAS vertical-launch system and Turkish Hisar-D air-defence missiles.
Eight İstif-class frigates are now planned.
The naval sector demonstrates one of Turkey’s most important industrial advantages: it can manufacture platforms while simultaneously developing many of the subsystems installed inside them.
Gaps remain
Although Turkey’s progress is remarkable, several important gaps remain to be filled in its indigenisation efforts.
Aeroengines are an area of obvious concern. The Turkish establishment has invested systematically in gas turbine technology at multiple scales – TEI’s TF6000 for unmanned platforms, the TF10000 (afterburning) for the Bayraktar Kızılelma, the TF35000 for the KAAN, the TS1400 turboshaft for the T625 Gökbey, and the MSB R&D Centre’s own Onur turboshaft and Güçhan turbofan. Although significant resources have been allocated, most programmes remain under development or at prototype stage.
Semiconductors are another area where Turkey lacks indigenous capability, although they form the backbone of any modern defence industry. Although Turkey may design its own semiconductors, it contracts TSMC to manufacture these components. Turkey has just launched a $5 billion programme to bring semiconductor fabrication to Turkey, but these efforts will take time and further investment to bear fruit. Building domestic semiconductor fabrication capacity is possible, but it requires sustained investment, skilled personnel and access to specialised manufacturing equipment. Access to the most advanced production tools remains constrained by concentrated global supply chains and export controls.
Finance is another issue. Sustaining simultaneous programmes across aircraft, missiles, ships, tanks and air defence places enormous demands on the country’s financial and engineering resources. Turkey has been able to leverage private and public finance to progress these programmes, but as these programmes increase in complexity, costs escalate. Turkey will need to seek partners to sustain them. Although there are multiple potential partners, including Pakistan, Bangladesh, Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern states, political considerations – especially deference to US interests rather than their own – may limit opportunities to co-operate.
Turkey’s defence industry cannot yet be described as completely indigenous. But in an age of globalisation and distributed supply chains, even the United States does not possess a defence industry entirely independent of foreign inputs.
Turkey’s progress has been remarkable. It has moved from an industry centred on foreign procurement and licensed production to one capable of designing, manufacturing, integrating and exporting complete weapons systems with minimal foreign subsystems.
Turkey now possesses an industrial ecosystem rather than a collection of isolated national weapons programmes. It has established the foundation to produce modern weapons systems both for its own armed forces and for export.
