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Groomed in Camp Bucca, Ahmed al-Sharaa — the former jihadi turned politician — is now Washington’s man in Damascus. But one year into his rule, al-Sharaa faces formidable challenges both at home and abroad. His visit to the United States this week is not a victory lap, but a survival mission: to secure aid, military guarantees, and political legitimacy.
On 10 November, the White House rolled out the red carpet for Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa. It was a remarkable image — the onetime Abu Muhammad Jolani, a man once hunted as a terrorist, now greeted as a head of state. Al-Sharaa’s rise was as violent as it was rapid: his forces overthrew Bashar al-Assad’s long-entrenched regime a year ago. But the man who once commanded fighters in Idlib now governs a fractured country struggling to rebuild. For Washington, Syria has become a critical pillar of its new Levantine strategy — a plan to reshape the region’s security architecture after the Gaza and Lebanon wars.
Public Enemies, Private Complicity
For decades, Washington portrayed Syria as an anti-imperial rogue state — a sponsor of terrorism and a threat to Israel. Yet beneath the rhetoric, the Assad dynasty quietly cooperated with the US in a public enemies but private complicity relationship. Hafez al-Assad maintained back-channel ties with Henry Kissinger and entered Lebanon with tacit US approval. Damascus backed Washington during the Iran-Iraq war and joined the US-led coalition in 1991’s Gulf War.
When Bashar al-Assad inherited his father’s throne in 2000, he followed his father’s footsteps — offering intelligence cooperation and keeping Israel’s border quiet. But Bashar came to power just as the American neoconservatives were ascendant, advocating the overthrow of regimes across the Middle East, including his own. To placate them, Bashar deepened intelligence-sharing with the CIA on jihadist networks entering Iraq after 2003. When the Arab Spring reached Syria in 2011, US officials were still calling him “a reformer” essential to Israel’s security.
For decades, Washington portrayed Syria as an anti-imperial rogue state — a sponsor of terrorism and a threat to Israel. Yet beneath the rhetoric, the Assad dynasty quietly cooperated with the US in a public enemies but private complicity relationship
Washington’s Regional Blueprint
Syria has long been a tool in American regional strategy — a state that, through proxies, shaped outcomes in Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine while keeping Israel’s northern frontier calm. The 2011 uprising changed that balance, and US policy evolved from isolation to controlled fragmentation.
After the October 7 attacks in Israel, Washington sought to restructure the region. With China’s rise and new economic corridors linking India, the Middle East and Europe, stability in the Levant became indispensable. The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) requires a secure, normalised Israel — and a pacified neighbourhood. Armed groups like Hizbullah, Hamas and the Houthis are incompatible with such a vision.
The Gaza war provided the pretext for dismantling these armed groups. Israel, while historically content with Assad’s quiet border, saw an opportunity after his fall to secure its northern flank and sever Iran’s supply lines through Syria. US and Israeli goals thus converged — though for different reasons.

From Camp Bucca to Damascus
The story of Ahmed al-Sharaa begins in Iraq. Like many future jihadist commanders, he passed through the US-run Camp Bucca detention facility, which became an incubator for what would later emerge as ISIS. Released insurgents formed the group’s core leadership.
In Syria, ISIS’s local offshoot evolved into Jabhat al-Nusra, later rebranded by its leader — then known as Abu Muhammad Jolani — as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2016. Initially tied to al-Qaeda, Jolani eventually broke away, turning his movement into a quasi-state in Idlib with its own “Syrian Salvation Government.” This civilian arm administered education, health, reconstruction and religious law — a proto-state that mimicked governance while maintaining jihadist discipline.
Through Turkish tolerance and covert US engagement, HTS consolidated its hold in northern Syria, quietly transforming from insurgent network to political movement.
The Israeli Problem
Assad’s fall gave Israel an opening it had long desired. Within 48 hours, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced airstrikes to destroy remaining Syrian military assets “so they would not fall into jihadist hands.” Over the following months, Israel conducted more than 350 strikes on airfields, anti-aircraft systems, and weapons sites, then advanced into the demilitarized Golan Heights zone — effectively annexing adjacent Syrian territory.
Israel justified its moves as self-defence, arguing that all previous arrangements with Damascus were void. It then courted the Druze minority and the disempowered Alawites, fuelling sectarian clashes that erupted into massacres in March 2025. For Israel, Syria’s fragmentation presented a once-in-a-generation chance to redraw its northern frontier — a strategy increasingly at odds with US efforts to stabilise the country.
A Unified Syria
To consolidate al-Sharaa’s rule, Washington forced a political marriage between the Damascus government and the Kurdish administration in the north. In October 2025, US CENTCOM flew Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) leader Mazloum Abdi to Damascus, where he signed an integration agreement with al-Sharaa — effectively ending Kurdish autonomy in exchange for representation.
For the US, a unified Syria serves its strategic purpose: a single authority to engage, stabilise and include in its regional security order. Al-Sharaa’s movement, now wearing suits instead of fatigues, presents itself as a pragmatic civilian government aligned with Western goals.
But Israel remains the wild card. It continues airstrikes inside Syria and expands into the south unchecked. To manage this, Washington announced on 6 November that it will establish a US military base in Damascus, anchoring a proposed U.S.-brokered Syrian-Israeli security pact — with American troops present to guarantee compliance from Israel.
In parallel, Washington lifted its sanctions on Syria and on al-Sharaa personally. The EU, UK and UN followed, opening the door for international aid and investment. Donors are now pledging billions for reconstruction — a move designed as much to stabilise the economy as to legitimise al-Sharaa’s rule.
Precarious Future
Yet Syria’s recovery is far from secure. Al-Sharaa must integrate rival militias, rebuild shattered institutions, and revive an economy wrecked by fifteen years of war. He governs a landscape of ruins, rival loyalties and simmering resentments.
Israel’s continued incursions are his greatest challenge. For Tel Aviv, the post-Assad vacuum is an opportunity too valuable to ignore; for Washington, it’s a headache that risks derailing its Levantine grand strategy.
For now, the US stands behind Ahmed al-Sharaa — the prisoner from Camp Bucca turned president — but history suggests Washington’s backing lasts only as long as its interests do. Unless al-Sharaa can rebuild Syria, unify its factions and tame its neighbours, his remarkable ascent may yet prove short-lived.
Note: The geopolity will be publishing a deep dive on the geopolitics of Syria, on the one-year anniversary of the fall of the al-Assad regime on 8th December 2025.




