Israel has long portrayed itself as the West’s “unsinkable aircraft carrier”, anchored permanently in the Middle East. Yet, like the naval vessels it invokes, recent operations suggest that its utility and invulnerability may be less assured than once believed.
In its latest confrontation with Iran, Israel has demonstrated clear advantages in air power. Iranian air defences, many of 1970s vintage, proved no match for Israel’s modern aircraft, electronic warfare capabilities and precision-guided munitions. Israeli propaganda and bravado aside, this success was not achieved in isolation. It depended heavily on permissive airspace provided by neighbouring Arab states, without which the constraints of limited refuelling capacity and reduced early warning would have complicated operations considerably.
Despite achieving a degree of air superiority, troubling signs have emerged. Reports of a F-35 Lightning II being downed or severely damaged by an Iranian surface-to-air missile system raise uncomfortable questions. The aircraft, long regarded as the pinnacle of stealth technology, was assumed to be largely immune to such threats. That even a relatively unsophisticated system could track and strike it will not reassure planners contemplating future conflicts with more capable adversaries.
Expectations within Israel that targeted assassinations of senior Iranian leadership would trigger regime collapse have not been realised
Tehran’s response has also been notable for its scale and coordination. Drawing, it is claimed, on intelligence support from China and Russia, Iran reportedly targeted and disabled early-warning radar installations in Qatar and Jordan. The result has been an increased reliance on airborne warning systems, such as AWACS aircraft, which, while capable, cannot replicate the persistence and coverage of ground-based networks and two of which have been confirmed to have been destroyed among several airborne tankers.
Missile exchanges have further exposed the economic and strategic strain of prolonged conflict. Israel’s vaunted missile defence systems, including Iron Dome and Arrow, have intercepted many incoming threats, but at significant cost. Each interception may require multiple interceptors, with expenses running into millions of dollars per missile. As stockpiles diminish, prioritisation becomes inevitable, leaving less critical areas exposed.
Assessing the full extent of damage within Israel remains difficult due to strict censorship. Nevertheless, certain strikes, including those affecting critical infrastructure such as the Haifa refinery, are impossible to conceal. For a country accustomed to fighting wars largely beyond its borders, the experience of sustained strikes on its own territory marks a significant shift.
As for Israeli fantasies of a greater Israel encompassing large parts of Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Egypt, then its current difficulties in Lebanon and Gaza will exclude such an endeavour. Against relative few and lightly armed opposition the Israeli army has reached breaking point with a dire warning from Eyal Zamir, Chief of Staff of the Israeli army of an imminent collapse in the combat effectiveness of the army due to prolonged deployment. Against more capable and numerous enemies the Israeli army’s difficulties would be magnified.
The broader strategic picture is equally sobering. Expectations within Israel that targeted assassinations of senior Iranian leadership would trigger regime collapse have not been realised. On the contrary, the conflict appears to have consolidated Tehran’s position. Successors have been swiftly installed, dissent suppressed and economic shortcomings reframed as the unavoidable cost of war.
Expectations within Israel that targeted assassinations of senior Iranian leadership would trigger regime collapse have not been realised
Underlying these developments is a deeper structural challenge. Israel’s long-term security doctrine has rested on maintaining a decisive technological edge, underwritten by Western, chiefly American, support. Yet in an era of rapid proliferation, advanced military capabilities are no longer the preserve of a few. Fifth-generation fighter programmes are emerging in countries such as Turkey and Pakistan, while Chinese platforms are increasingly available on the global market. The assumption of enduring qualitative superiority is no longer secure.
The conflict with Iran has shown that Israel defences against an adversary over a thousand miles away are lacking; against a capable adversary on its border Israel is indefensible. The existence of Israel is predicated on the existence of the current Arab regimes. Israel is simply a coup or assassination away from total destruction; any ground war against a more numerous but even moderately capable adversary will destroy Israeli armed forces by attrition alone. This fact was significantly highlighted by Hezbollah’s destruction of over 29 supposedly indestructible Merkva V tanks among and 100 other Israeli military vehicles.
Equally, Israel’s preference for a fragmented Middle East, divided along ethnic and sectarian lines, appears harder to sustain. Hopes that Kurdish forces might spearhead a broader campaign against Tehran have not materialised. Across the region, minority groups are recalibrating, mindful that external backing may prove fleeting.
Israel’s preference for a fragmented Middle East, divided along ethnic and sectarian lines, appears harder to sustain
Finally, the question of American support looms large. Within the United States, public opinion is far from settled. There are growing voices questioning the extent and nature of US involvement, particularly if it risks escalating into a costly ground conflict. Should American casualties mount, political tolerance for intervention could diminish sharply, placing future support for Israel in doubt.
Israeli society also lies exposed. Once considered as the Middle East’s only liberal democracy, Israel has now been shown to be fascist state closer in culture to Nazi Germany than the US. No freedom loving US citizen will consider sacrificing their own or their offspring’s life to save Israel from a fate of its own making. Furthermore, Israel in considered by the majority of US voters as a reckless state with an unwarranted influence over US politicians to detriment of the US dragging the US into unnecessary and expensive conflict when priorities at home are being ignored.
The current ceasefire leaves Israel high and dry. It has failed to achieve any of its strategic objectives, its adversaries have proved more resilient than it envisaged and it leaves this war isolated and ostracised.
In sum, the image of Israel as an impregnable bastion is under increasing strain. Its military remains formidable, but the strategic environment in which it operates is shifting, and not, it would appear, in its favour.
