On Aug. 7, the Kremlin and the White House confirmed that Russian President Vladimir Putin and US President Donald Trump will be meeting directly in Alaska in order to strike a deal over Ukraine. The Alaska conference as it is now being called is scheduled for Aug 15, and is being compared to the infamous Berlin and Paris conferences. President Donald Trump’s shifting approach to the war in Ukraine has underscored a deeper instability in American foreign policy. Once vocal about punishing Russia through sanctions and isolation, Trump has increasingly softened his rhetoric, floating from a ceasefire to now directly meeting with Vladimir Putin. This inconsistency has weakened Washington’s stance and exposed fractures within its strategic posture.
What began as a calculated plan by the US foreign policy establishment to degrade and fragment Russian power is rapidly unravelling. The initial objective was to deny Russia access to Ukraine, reducing it to a marginalized Asiatic force and thereby preventing a security vacuum in Eurasia, one that might be filled by China.
In parallel, the US sought to entrap China in a Taiwan conflict, mirroring the strategy deployed against Moscow in Ukraine. The long-term vision was geopolitical transformation: divide Russia into manageable zones and replace China’s Communist Party with a pro-Western government.
President Trump has left Ukraine’s president Zelensky out of the conversation
Russia’s Military-Industrial Transformation
The war in Ukraine is turning into a strategic defeat for the US. Far from weakening Russia, the prolonged conflict has catalysed a military and industrial transformation. Despite early losses and intelligence failures, Russia has restructured its economy and retooled its industry for war.
While NATO relies on precision-guided systems and costly logistics, Moscow has leaned into volume producing drones, artillery shells, and short-range missiles in vast quantities. The simplicity and scale of Russia’s approach are proving more effective in a protracted war of attrition.
Western stockpiles are now being exhausted at an alarming rate. Ukraine’s defensive systems, heavily reliant on NATO resupply, are running low. As a result, both Kyiv and its allies are increasingly threatening to use offensive systems in an attempt to slow the Russian advance. This shift is not without consequence.
In response, Russia has issued a revised nuclear doctrine, lowering its threshold for tactical nuclear use if NATO weapons are used to strike deep within Russian territory. The Kremlin has made clear that any such escalation will be met with a devastating response.
For Moscow, the stakes are existential. Ukraine is not simply a neighbour; it is, in the Kremlin’s view, a buffer zone whose loss would push NATO to Russia’s doorstep. Putin’s goals are now unambiguous: remove President Zelensky, install a pro-Russian government, secure eastern Ukraine, demilitarise the remainder of the country and turn the rump state into a neutral entity. This would not only eliminate a potential NATO member, but also reassert Russia’s dominance over its historic sphere of influence. This outcome would be a catastrophe for Western security doctrine. Already, Washington appears to be scrambling to ignite or threaten new flashpoints from the Black Sea to Kaliningrad, from the Arctic to the Caucasus in an effort to reassert its grip. But these efforts may be beyond its means.
The American military model, built on overwhelming force, air superiority, expensive high-tech weapons, and limited boots on the ground, is showing signs of exhaustion. It proved ineffective in Iraq and Afghanistan when the US could dominate the skies with impunity. But against a peer adversary capable of absorbing losses and fighting a long war in Ukraine, this doctrine appears insufficient.
The American military model, built on overwhelming force, air superiority, expensive high-tech weapons, and limited boots on the ground, is showing signs of exhaustion
Compounding the problem is America’s vulnerability to its own supply chains. Sophisticated systems like Patriot missiles require rare earth materials from China, specialized parts from Europe, and expanded production capacity in firms like Raytheon. Any disruption such as China’s earlier restriction on rare earth export has the potential to paralyze entire sectors.
Trump’s earlier tariff threats against Beijing had to be walked back when China’s response halted US automobile production. A similar dependency now looms over the defence industry.
Should Ukraine fall, it would send shockwaves through the global order. US security guarantees from Europe to Asia would be called into question. The image of American reliability, already frayed, could unravel completely. Allies may begin to hedge, adversaries may be emboldened, and the assumptions underpinning U.S. leadership could collapse.
The Alaska Conference
The summit comes after Trump’s electoral campaign promised an end to the war in Ukraine within 24 hours. Despite a number of meetings between the US and Russia, no progress has transpired. Despite Trump unilaterally announcing the US would impose 100% tariffs on countries that do business with Russia if no peace agreement was reached within 50 days, which he then proceeded to shorten even further. This has now turned into a direct meeting between Trump and Putin.
The Russian offer on the table is that it would claim – effectively annex – the Ukrainian territories of Donetsk and Luhansk, and freeze its current positions in the Zaporizhia and Kherson regions. The alternative to this offer is a continuation of the war until Russia takes everything it wants from Ukraine. Time is on Russia’s side as the exhausted and outgunned Ukrainian forces struggle to stem Russian advances in many areas along the over 600-mile front line, while Ukrainian cities are battered by swarms of Russian missiles and drones.
The only way for a successful outcome for the US is by forcing Ukraine to agree to territorial concessions. Additionally, it will likely also be forced to become a neutral country and formally end its aspirations to join NATO and the EU. This US would also need to force this settlement on Europe too.
A deal with Russia – even at Ukraine’s expense – would cost the US little but could create a wedge between Moscow and Beijing. Such a shift would give Washington far greater leverage over China, particularly if the US and Russia could align on cooperation over rare earth minerals
The Alaska conference really places Russia in the driving seat. If Russia prioritises a deal with the US to end the Ukraine war, the US will secure its objective. If, however, Moscow keeps its focus on the larger game – with Ukraine as only one piece – it will seek to preserve its main source of leverage over the US: its strategic relationship with China.
President Trump has left Ukraine’s president Zelensky out of the conversation; Ukrainian officials have no say in the future of their country. Even before the conference begins on Aug 15, Putin has secured a summit on US soil, this implies the US will not enforce the ICJ arrest warrant against Putin. By ensuring Ukraine’s exclusion, Putin will propose his terms without considering Ukraine’s position.