Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran and the US
Trita Parsi
2008
Trita Parsi’s eye-opening book is one which explores the complex and evolving relationship between Israel, Iran and the US that challenges, if not outright dismantles, many assumptions and beliefs that have become regular talking points of both the mainstream and alternative media.
Given the current political climate, I approached the book hoping to understand answers to three key questions:
- Has the Iranian led “Axis of Resistance” become a target for Western imperialists due to Iran’s support for Palestine?
- What is the true nature of Israeli-Iranian hostilities?
- What directs US interests in the region?
I was pleasantly surprised to find that it adequately addresses all three with reasons which were rather unexpected.
Very early on we are introduced to the forgotten history of the Children of Israel in Persia and are reminded of how intertwined both cultures have been for the majority of Jewish and Persian history. It is from this angle that Israeli officials seem to hold a genuine respect (and almost envy and fear) of the rich history of Persia and the “7,000 years of diplomacy” that sits under the turbans of Iranian diplomats.
Before the “Axis of Resistance” alliance of Iran and Russia, the book reminds us how traditionally both regions have been mortal enemies as they lie on either side of the Caspian Sea. The USSR inflamed these historical tensions for Iran as the growing influence of Communism spread to Iraq, Afghanistan and Egypt during the Cold War leaving both Iran and the newly formed settler-state of Israel vulnerable. The Shah of Iran’s megalomaniac reign saw a time of rapprochement with hostile Arab states while he helped keep Israel just strong enough to keep the Arabs occupied and less worried about Persian ambitions. However, the Shah’s policies frustrated the Israelis who saw a man with threatening ambitions and no real commitment to Israel.
In one instance he tries to prevent Israel from growing too strong for comfort as they did during the 1973 Yom Kippur War; the Shah supplied Arab states with oil and logistics and railed against Israel demanding they respect UN frameworks. The US, under President Nixon, had also made Iran, along with Saudi Arabia, a key part of its “Twin Pillar Policy” to ensure the security of the Persian Gulf on America’s behalf. This didn’t help stem the Shah’s growing narcissism. Contrary to popular beliefs, the overthrow of the Shah and the 1979 Islamic Revolution gave Israel a chance to reset and renew their relationship with Iran.
Soon after, the US sends Donald Rumsfeld to flatter Saddam Hussein in Iraq — again, Israel and Iran unite as they see Saddam as the primary threat in the region. The Arab world, and both the US and USSR backed Saddam as he sent forces to invade Iran in 1980. A concerned Israel uses back channels to supply Iran with arms, so that neither Iran or Iraq emerge too powerful. It isn’t long before soon the US and Arabs scramble against Saddam as he turns on Kuwait in 1990 while Israel is using back channels to reach out to him! While the book is a tapestry of detail, it becomes almost impossible to keep up with the number of changing alliances within short periods of time as neither stated ideology or friendships hold: the only constant for all actors seems to be regional dominance and national interests.
One thing is clear however — whether it was tackling the Soviet threat, the Iran-Contra Affair or Operation Opera to destroy Iraqi nuclear facilities — Israel and Iran took plenty of opportunities to work with each other to balance and neutralise their rivals, often seeing themselves as the only non-Arab states in a hostile environment. This Israeli “doctrine of the periphery” of maintaining alliances outside the threatening Arab core of the Middle East lasted well past the Islamic Revolution.
What’s particularly interesting is that the “Islamic” Revolution of 1979 does very little to change the interests, ambitions and pragmatism of Shah’s secular Iran which puts the sincerity of the Ayatollah’s under serious scrutiny. In one particular incident Ayatollah Khomeini is informed that weapons procured by Iran are being made in Israel. After asking whether it’s necessary to inquire about the source of the weapons when making the purchase, his associate replies no. Khomeini calmly concludes, “…then, we don’t care.” In another incident, Khomeini’s trusted cabinet member, Hassan Karoubi, even goes as far as to help put the Israelis at ease by telling them, “We are interested in cooperating with the West. We have common interests, and wish to be part of the West.”
But it is a relationship that only fades as the rival threats disappear; the breakup of the USSR and the first Gulf War against Saddam suddenly leaves Israel and Iran looking at each other. Now the formerly hostile Arab states are brought into alliances with Israel and the tensions are with the periphery! The development of missile technology changed the equation as distance from the borders became less of a safety net. Iran’s nuclear ambition combined with its regional aspirations alone makes it Israel’s enemy long before Islamic causes were used by Iran to conjure support from the “Arab Street”. It was interesting to find that Israel constantly harbours a suspicion that Iran’s relationship with Israel was based only on Iran gaining proximity to the US. Once Iran establishes that relationship, Israel fears the Jewish State will no longer be able to match Iran in serving US interests. This particular worry meant Israel would now do everything it can to burn bridges between the US and Iran.
By the time of the collapse of the USSR, the US — the world’s lone superpower — has both Israel and Iran vying for its attention. But with a powerful Israeli lobby dominating US domestic politics there was only going to be one winner, even if the US and Iran had many shared interests in the Persian Gulf. The influence of AIPAC is particularly shocking as even the appeal of “moderate” Iranian governments under Rafsanjani and Khatami did little to thaw relations. The Clinton administration become infatuated with the possibilities that could come with the “Iranian Gorbachev” Khatami; however, even $3.8 billion worth of trade between the two nations in 1994 and a massive deal outlining US company Conoco to take control of Iran’s oil industries wasn’t enough to stop the lobby from spoiling Clinton’s plans. All of it was put to a halt under the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act.
For Iran, a major turning point seems to be earlier at the 1991 Madrid Conference. When the US decided to organise a multilateral meeting of forty-three nations and fifteen regional states for Middle-East decision making, Washington dashed Iran’s hopes by refusing to invite it. Humiliated, Iran decides to leverage the Palestine issue and its proxy, Hezbollah in Lebanon, as a spoiler against both the US and Israel. With no cards to play, Tehran decides its ‘soft-power’ policy of offering fiery rhetoric in support of Palestine could be acted upon — but just enough to get the superpower’s attention, not with any intention of liberating Palestine. This was made clear a lot earlier when Iranian clerics were given a guided tour of Jerusalem by Israeli military attaché, Yitzhak Segev! When Segev asked Iranians about Khomenei’s ideology and if Iran was really seeking to conquer Jerusalem, the Iranians replied with a smile, “…that goal wouldn’t be pursued in our lifetime.”
Despite the insult of the Madrid snub, major Iranian gestures and concessions towards the US continue well into the 21st century following 9/11 and the US’ “War on Terror”. Iran provides logistical support, offering its own airbases and the influence of its militias and assets in both countries. Not only are these gestures not reciprocated, they are often completely shunned as the neocon government of George Bush adopts a much more hardline policy towards Iran. While Iran’s anger grows towards the influence of Israel in Western politics, Iran seems baffled at why the US can’t see some benefit and appreciation for what it can offer. As the book goes on it becomes very difficult to not see the analogy of the abused wife with Stockholm Syndrome vying for a husband who openly pampers his Israeli mistress! In the end Israel seems satisfied that it has managed to completely decouple US relations with Iran, while Israel wants nothing less than complete submission from the Persian state especially after the failed wars in Afghanistan and Iraq inadvertently expand Tehran’s influence — the US reluctantly reaches out for help once it becomes stuck in a quagmire. Iran obliges.
Trita Parsi’s book was written in 2008 when Barack Obama came to power but it is amazing to see how well his research helps understand current events and relations between the US, Israel and Iran. At over 300 pages Parsi’s book may come across as repetitive — but for serious political analysts and those looking for the devil in the details when it comes to the politics that is dominating the news today, this makes for essential reading.
